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In the instant case, the Illinois Appellate Court viewed the Villareal
case as controlling and held that the defendant's motion to dismiss was
an admission of the allegations contained in the complaint for the purpose
of argument only. Plaintiff's complaint charged that the defendant was
and continues to be in a position to divert business from the plaintiffs.
The defendant could not be considered to have admitted the verity of
such an allegation by his motion to dismiss.
By its decision in the Phelan case, the Illinois Appellate Court con-
tinues to assert that the discretionary power possessed by the trial court
in granting temporary injunctions is not to be controlled by technical
legal rules. However, the court has wisely held that verification of the
complaint by affidavit or petition is one technical rule that the chancellor
cannot overlook. The exercise of injunctive power requires great caution
and deliberation and should not be exercised in doubtful cases. There-
fore, it is necessary that the complaint for a temporary injunction clearly
show a prima facie need for such relief. In Phelan, the court justifiably
held that it is essential to such a showing that the allegations contained
in the complaint be supported by a verified petition or affidavit.
EUGENE K. FRIKER
CRIMINAL LAW-SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE-THE OWNER OF LEASED
PROPERTY DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO OBJECT TO THE USE OF EVIDENCE
OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH OF THE LEASED PROPERTY
NOR Is HE EXEMPT FROM ESTABLISHING STANDING UNLESS THE OFFENSE
CHARGED IS UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF THE GOODS SEIZED.-In the recent
case of People v. DeFilippis, 54 Ill. App. 2d 137, 203 N.E.2d 627 (1st Dist.
1964), the Appellate Court of Illinois held that the owner of leased
property did not have "standing" to object to the use of evidence which
was obtained as a result of an illegal search of the leased property in
violation of the Constitution.' The court also held that the only exception
to the rule, requiring a defendant to establish his "standing" before he
can object to the use of evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search
and seizure, arises when the proof of possession of the seized goods would
also contribute proof of the crime charged.
In the DeFilippis case, FBI agents, acting without a warrant, entered
a garage, arrested four of the defendants, and seized radios which were
alleged to be stolen property. The fifth defendant, DeFilippis, was later
1 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const.
amend. IV. Ill. Const. art. II § 6 is substantially the same.
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
arrested when he appeared outside the garage. DeFilippis was the owner
of the garage but he had previously leased it to another.
The defendants were indicted for burglary and theft. On motions
by the defendants, the trial court ordered the evidence suppressed. The
Appellate Court reversed and remanded with directions to deny the mo-
tions because the defendants had failed to show their right to possession
of the goods seized or their right to be on the premises searched. Although
DeFilippis was the owner of the property searched, he failed to show that
he had a right to the possession of the garage since he had previously
leased it to another.2 The Appellate Court also held that the defendants
were not exempt from establishing "standing" because the crime with
which they were charged was not the unlawful possession of the goods
seized. A petition for rehearing was denied in a supplemental opinion.
The "exclusionary rule," excluding the use of evidence obtained as
a result of an illegal search and seizure in violation of the Constitution,3
was established as a means of enforcing the right against illegal searches
and seizures by agents of the Federal Government. 4 The states were not
required to exclude evidence so derived, 5 but many states, including Illi-
nois,6 adopted the "exclusionary rule" as a protection against unreasonable
searches by agents of the State.7 In the recent case of Mapp v. Ohio,s it
was decided that the "exclusionary rule" is a Constitutional mandate and
therefore binding upon the states.
Because the right to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure
is personal, 9 the "exclusionary rule" is based on the theory that the
evidence is excluded to provide a remedy for a violation of the defendant's
right.10 Therefore, the right to object to the search and seizure and to
the use of the evidence obtained therefrom, may be invoked only by "the
person whose rights have been invaded .... .11 In the past, the courts
have required the defendant to show a right to the possession of the seized
property or a possessory interest in the property searched in order to
establish his "standing" to object to the use of the evidence. 12 This re-
2 The court cited Baumgardner v. Consolidated Copying Co., 44 Ill. App. 74, 75
(1st Dist. 1892) where it was stated that "a lease is an agreement for exclusive possession."
3 See note 1, supra.
4 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341 (1914).
5 See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 Sup. Ct. 1359 (1949), where the Court held
that the "exclusionary rule" was a judicial rule of evidence of the Federal courts, and as
such, was not binding upon the states.
6 People v. Castree, 311 Ill. 392, 143 N.E. 112 (1924).
7 See People v. Mayo, 19 Ill. 2d 136, 166 N.E.2d 440 (1960), where the court stated
that the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is based on the invasion of
privacy rather than on the self-incriminatory effect of the evidence used.
8 367 U.S. 643, 81 Sup. Ct. 1684 (1961).
9 People v. Pitts, 26 111. 2d 395, 186 N.E.2d 357 (1962).
10 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 Sup. Ct. 725 (1960).
11 Coon v. United States, 36 F.2d 164, 165 (10th Cir. 1929).
12 See, e.g., People v. Exum, 382 Ill. 204, 47 N.E.2d 56 (1943); People v. Perry, 1 I11.
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quirement was relaxed in the case of Jones v. United States.18 In the Jones
case, the police, acting with a search warrant, entered the petitioner's
apartment and found narcotics. The petitioner, who had been given the
use of the apartment by a friend, was indicted on two charges: that he
"purchased, sold, dispensed and distributed" narcotics which were not in
the "original stamped package," in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 4707(a), and,
that he "facilitated the concealment and sale of" narcotics, knowing that
they had been illegally imported, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 174. The
statutes permitted conviction upon proof of possession of narcotics and
proof of possession of narcotics which lacked the appropriate stamps.
The petitioner moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the
search warrant had been issued without probable cause. The United
States Supreme Court abolished the common law distinctions of "guest,"
"invitee," "licensee," and "lessee," in determining the defendant's propri-
etary interest in the property searched, and held that anyone legitimately
on the premises where the search occurs may object to the evidence
obtained as a result of the illegal search. The same Court also made an
exception to the requirement of "standing" in holding that where the
same possession necessary to establish "standing" would also convict the
defendant, he is not required to prove his "standing" to object to the use
of the evidence. Recognizing that if the defendant were required to prove
"standing," it would mean an admission that he had committed the offense,
the Court stated:
.... It is not consonant with the amenities, to put it mildly, of the
administration of criminal justice to sanction such squarely con-
tradictory assertions of power by the Government.'
4
Illinois has complied with the Jones case but has declined to further
relax its requirements for establishing "standing."' 5 Therefore, to establish
"standing," a defendant must prove: (1) that he has a possessory interest in
the premises searched; or (2) that he was legitimately on the premises
searched; or (3) that he has a right to the possession of the property seized.
A defendant is only exonerated from establishing "standing" where the
proof of the possession of property seized would also constitute proof of
the crime which he is charged with having committed.
In DeFilippis, the evidence seized consisted of stolen radios. The
court held that the defendants did not come within the exception of the
Jones case as possession of stolen radios was not in itself a crime, nor did
the possession constitute proof of a crime. The court, in so holding, said:
2d 482, 116 N.E.2d 360 (1954); People v. Gambino, 12 Ill. 2d 29, 145 N.E.2d 42 (1957);
People v. Perroni, 14 Ill. 2d 581, 153 N.E.2d 578 (1958).
13 362 U.S. 257, 80 Sup. Ct. 725 (1960).
14 Id. at 263-4, 80 Sup. Ct. at 732.
15 See, e.g., People v. Mayo, 19 Ill. 2d 136, 166 N.E.2d 440 (1960); People v. Kelly, 23
Ill. 2d 193, 177 N.E.2d 830 (1961); People v. Bankhead, 27 Ill. 2d 18, 187 N.E.2d 705 (1963).
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.* .. But where the crime charged, as in the instant case, does not
rest on possession, the principle laid down in the Jones case does
not apply. 16
Although a valid distinction, the rationale of the Jones case would seem
to apply, as the "unexplained possession of recently stolen property gives
rise to an inference of guilt which may be sufficient to sustain a con-
viction for theft."'17 In such a case, the Government would be in the same
contradictory position which the Jones case sought to eliminate.
The present status of the law, allowing anyone who is legitimately
on the premises searched to object, in essence allows the defendant to
assert the right of the person who has the possessory interest in the
premises. In DeFilippis, the defendant, DeFilippis, was the owner of the
premises searched. DeFilippis leased the premises and failed to show that
he reserved a right to possession for himelf. Therefore, he did not have
"standing" to object to the use of evidence illegally seized in a garage
which he owned.'8 It seems rather inconsistent to allow anyone legitimately
on the premises to assert the right of the person who has a possessory
interest in the premises but not to allow the owner of the premises to
assert the right of his lessee in objecting to the use of evidence obtained
as a result of an illegal search of the premises.
It would certainly seem that any defendant, against whom the fruits
of an illegal search and seizure are to be used in evidence, would be a
person sufficiently "aggrieved" to avail himself of the protection afforded
by statute.19 To abolish the requirement of "standing" and to allow a
person so "aggrieved" to object to the evidence, would not only be logical
but also the most practical means of protecting against violations of the
Constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.20
MARTIN LILLIG
16 People v. DeFilippis, 54 Ill. App. 2d 137, 140, 203 N.E.2d 627, 629 (1st Dist. 1964).
17 People v. Boulahanis, 50 Ill. App. 2d 440, 442, 200 N.E.2d 372, 373 (1st Dist. 1964).
18 See also United States v. Konigsberg, 336 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1964) where the court
held that a defendant who was a lessee of the searched property did not have "standing"
to challenge the search because he had in turn leased the premises to a third party. The
DeFilippis case was decided one month prior to the Konigsberg case.
19 11. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 114-12 (1963) and 18 U.S.C.A., Rule 41(e) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure allow "persons aggrieved" by an illegal search and seizure
to move to suppress the evidence obtained as a result thereof.
20 See Stan. L. Rev. 515 (1957) for the apparent success that California has had in
protecting against violations of the Constitution since it abolished the requirement of
"standing" in People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
